Mapping Africa Transformations
Instability is on the rise in the Sahel and West Africa. Violent events and civilian casualties are increasing. Our tools help policy makers to better understand the geography of violence which leads to better designed, place-based and contextualised policies.
Leveraging a dataset of 3,800 actors and 60,000 violent events from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project ACLED), SWAC/OECD maps the changing relationships between actors in conflict across 21 countries from 1997-2023. These actors include state forces, rebel groups and extremist organisations. Their relationships are complex and volatile. They take the form of rivalries and alliances. Rivalries refers to conflictual relationships that result in violent events; alliances refer to co-operative relationships. Conflict networks change constantly; organisations that were allies one day can fight each other the next and co-operate later again.
Conflict in West Africa is characterised by a growing number of violent actors. This number has increased consistently since the late 2000s. The conflicts are dominated by rivalrous relationships. This has catastrophic consequences for the stability of the region and the security of civilian populations.
The rivalry network is compact considering the size of the region, the number of countries involved, and the various actors implicated in acts of violence. In West Africa, the region has become one large theatre of military conflict, in which violent activities are no longer isolated but part of a wider conflict environment. In the first half of 2023, 468 actors were involved, as victims or perpetrators, in acts of violence throughout North and West Africa, resulting in 771 rivalrous relationships.
Nigerian civilians occupy the centre of the rivalry network, because they are targeted by both governmental forces, extremist violent organisations, and other armed groups. In the Central Sahel, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslim (JNIM) is not only the largest coalition of Jihadist organisations of the region but also the one with the largest number of enemies.
This network shows actors that voluntarily engage in alliances. It is much smaller than the rivalry network. Each actor has on average just over two allies. The network is dominated by alliances between governmental forces and their allied militias.
The network brings together the Nigerian military and police forces and the Civilian Joints Task Force, a federation of militias created to fight Boko Haram. In the Central Sahel, the most active alliances are those between the military forces of Mali and the Wagner Group, and between the military forces of Burkina Faso and auxiliary forces.
Over the last 23 years, North and West Africa has been dominated by conflict rather than co-operation. The density of rivalrous relationships has remained consistently higher than the density of co-operative relationships.
The slight overall trend toward increased co-operation is mainly driven by the formation of a Government of National Unity in Libya, and secondarily by new partnerships between African governments, local militias, and mercenaries, and by the consolidation of Jihadist groups.
Over the last two decades, the conflict environment has become increasingly centred around a few exceptionally violent actors. This indicates that powerful state and non-state actors fight each other regularly, while being surrounded by actors marginally involved in acts of violence. This is a consequence of the consolidation of power observed in Libya and in the Central Sahel. In contrast, only a handful of state actors have managed to create a large coalition around them.
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